In a classic children's story, The Enormous Egg, published in the U.S. in 1956, a scientist laments, in a tone of dismay and wonder, that he can understand complicated scientific ideas, but he can't understand Congress. Although the scenario in the book is fictional-Congress wants to kill a dinosaur that is costing too much to feed at the National Zoo-the concern is all too real, and it's heard at least as often today as it was a half-century ago.
"Why would Congress limit stem cell research?" many scientists ask. "How could Congress reject or ignore the science that indicates the climate is changing?" "Does Congress simply lack the most basic scientific information?" And these sorts of head-scratching questions are often followed, with exasperation, by, "Why did Congress eliminate its in-house Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), and shouldn't it bring it back immediately?" Congress created OTA in 1972 to prepare reports that would help Congress understand the technical background needed to act on issues related to science and technology and that would lay out several possible policy options to address such issues. The reports generally had to be requested by a member of Congress. OTA got set up just as the size of the Congressional staff was beginning to grow and Congress was looking to strengthen its own sources of information and expertise to counter that of the President and his appointees in the Executive Branch. Congress shut down OTA in 1995 in one of its first acts after the Republican Party recaptured control of the institution for the first time in 40 years. The Republicans described the elimination of OTA as a cost-cutting measure, and that was a large part of the motivation, but OTA was also seen by some as a bastion of liberalism.
Since its demise, OTA has taken on a symbolic, even mythical, importance that far outstrips any role it played while it was in existence. OTA did excellent work, and many of its reports can still serve as valuable reference material. (The Federation of American Scientists, for example, maintains an archive of OTA reports at http://www.fas.org/ota.) But the reports rarely played a pivotal role in decision-making and, like many reports, they were sometimes requested by Senators or Congressmen who already knew what they wanted to do and just were looking for some experts to back them up. Yet the story scientists often tell now is, in effect, that Congressional decisions went off track after OTA was abolished because members lacked the facts they needed to make the right choices.
This line of thinking is very seductiveit identifies a single cause for complex change and puts science at the center of the story-but it is based on fundamental misunderstandings about both politics and policy. First, OTA was abolished because American politics took on a more conservative cast; politics did not change because OTA was abolished. But more important, scientific results and other technical information are, and should be, only one factor in making policy decisions. And technical information rarely points to only a single policy option-even in cases where the majority of scientists favor one particular policy. Scientists are too often inclined to believe that "if you knew what I know, you'd think like I think."
The debate over stem cell research is a case in point. That debate turns primarily on ethical questions, and no amount of scientific information is going to, or should, determine whether one believes that stem cell research should go forward. Opposing stem cell research does not mean one is anti-science even if it does mean one is disagreeing with most scientists. (I say this as a supporter of stem cell research.)
An OTA study on stem cell research could have been helpful in examining the potential benefits of various types of stem cell research, in clarifying how many cell lines were available, in laying out a range of ways stem cell research could be regulated, even in surveying the ethical debate. But an OTA study would not have been able to dictate what the "scientific" answer to the stem cell quandary was because no such answer exists. Therefore, a study would not have significantly altered the Congressional vote on the issue. The vote changed when the public elected a Congress with different values, not different science.
This tendency to conflate scientific questions (i.e., questions related to the natural and physical sciences) with questions of values, policy, or economics is a perennial problem, and it afflicts almost every regulatory discussion, not just ones as emotionally charged as the conflict over stem cell research. Fights over whether to regulate a pollutant, for example, are usually framed as debates over the reliability of scientific findings, but often the actual disagreement is over the values question of how much risk is acceptable for society or whether reducing emissions is worth the cost.
This tendency (sometimes conscious, sometimes not) to confuse scientific and values debates may be getting worse because in a highly polarized political atmosphere everyone wants to claim Scientists often misunderstand the role science plays and should play in policy making. Those misconceptions are captured well in the debate over whether Congress should recreate an Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).
that their position on an issue is the "scientific" one, and therefore somehow beyond dispute. (Note that this attitude, although often not healthy for science, is based on respect for it.) An OTA study (or any other study) on a regulatory matter that helped separate scientific quarrels from differences that arise from other causes might be helpful for clarifying the debate, but it would not settle an issue. The values questions would remain the critical determinant.
A recent report from the Bipartisan Policy Center, "Improving the Use of Science in Regulatory Policy," brings home this point and recommends that federal agencies be required to distinguish between science and policy questions when they propose regulations (http://www.bipartisanpolicy. org/projects/science-policy). The report was written by a broad, bipartisan group that included both officials who served under President George W. Bush and their antagonists. (I directed the study.)
None of this is to say that members of Congress and their staffs always understand or accept scientific findings. The clearest case of a refusal to make peace with the science has been the debate over global climate change, although this has been gradually improving (and not solely because new members have been elected). The climate change debate is somehow seen as typifying the way politicians deal with science, but it is actually exceptional in every respect. It's rare that politicians debate a purely scientific question (i.e., are human activities changing the earth's climate?); it's rare that scientists can offer a clear (and codified) consensus view on a matter with policy implications; and it's rare that politicians ignore or quarrel with that consensus for a prolonged period.
But the problem has hardly been the unavailability of information. Reports by the Nobel prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the National Academy of Sciences, and many other credible groups have been widely circulated and briefed on Capitol Hill. The remaining in-house research arms of the Congress, such as the Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service, have put out papers summarizing the science. The addition of a study or two or three from OTA would not have made any difference on the overall debate whatsoever.
Studies, though, have had an impact on aspects of the climate debate, even while Republicans controlled the Congress. A Congressionally-requested National Academy of Sciences study in 2006, for example, quieted political attacks on the so-called "hockey stick graph," an effort to create a thousand-year temperature record that showed recent decades to be abnormally warm. And a study on the climate impact of biofuels, just published in Science in October, is igniting a discussion on how climate legislation should account for the burning of such fuels.
So, since 1995 when OTA was disbanded, Congress has hardly lacked for scientific information when it wanted it. That's why the Democrats, while supporting OTA in theory, have not been willing to spend the money to re-establish it since they regained control of the Congress in 2006. But starting up OTA again would be a good idea even though its impact was less far-reaching than is often suggested. An OTA would be especially helpful in matters on which the National Academies may be less suited-for example, defining problems that may be quietly brewing at the intersection of policy and science, or examining policy questions related to technology (as OTA's name and original mandate emphasized). Such examples might include a study of the implications of developments in neuroscience and genetics for the legal understanding of individual responsibility, or even more broadly, for our sense of what it means to be human. A less philosophical issue, and one more related to technology, would be analyzing what factors are limiting the ability of the U.S. to develop new energy technologies and what policies might reduce or remove those barriers. Neither of these are cases in which an OTA report would settle a dispute, but that was never the agency's function to begin with.
It seems safe to predict, though, that with or without an OTA, Congress will continue to baffle and frustrate scientists, at least some of the time, just as it does everyone else. Congress today is beset by many problems-the polarization of American politics, the changing nature of the media, the need for campaign finance reform, the tendency to delegate decision-making to, rather than just hear out, interest groups, to name a few. But even in the best of times, the legislative process seems arcane, labyrinthine, confusing. There is rarely a single "right" answer to a problem (although answers can prove to be wrong), but each constituent or constituency believes their approach is the right one.
That children's book, The Enormous Egg, is really an allegory about McCarthyism; science is just the plot device. Even in that tale, as in so many real-world examples, fights were only framed in terms of science; politics was the actual and legitimate subject of the battle.
